Economic limits to corporate growth in America by Dam, Robert A.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2006-12
Economic limits to corporate growth in America
Dam, Robert A.














Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 









 Co-Advisors:   David R. Henderson 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
December/2006 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  Economic Limits to Corporate Growth in America 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Robert A. Dam 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited  
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
This work explores the relationship between corporate and economic growth within the United States since 1929.  
The corporate share of GDP climbed from 52.5 percent in 1929 to 59.7 percent in 2005.  Depending upon the years 
included and the method of estimating respective growth rates, this increasing share of GDP accounts for up to 14 
percent of real domestic corporate growth.  However, the domestic corporate share of GDP can never exceed 100 
percent.  Subject to numerous assumptions, the models presented here estimate that this source of corporate growth 
could be exhausted as early as the year 2032.  Given the lack of discussion of this issue in the relevant literature, it is 
unlikely that current stock valuations account for the eventual loss of this source of growth.  The actual effect on 
stock prices of such a slowdown of domestic corporate growth will depend not only on how far into the future such an 
event occurs, but also on how successful these corporations are at finding new growth opportunities overseas.  More 
research is needed to better model future growth patterns and to understand the implications on stock valuations and 




15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
89 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Corporate Value Added, Corporate Growth, Stock Valuations, Value-added 
Accounting 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
ECONOMIC LIMITS TO CORPORATE GROWTH IN AMERICA 
 
Robert A. Dam 
Major, United States Air Force 
M.P.P., Harvard University, 1995 
B.S., U.S. Air Force Academy, 1993 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 

























Robert N. Beck 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
This work explores the relationship between corporate and economic growth 
within the United States since 1929.  The corporate share of GDP climbed from 52.5 
percent in 1929 to 59.7 percent in 2005.  Depending upon the years included and the 
method of estimating respective growth rates, this increasing share of GDP accounts for 
up to 14 percent of real domestic corporate growth.  However, the domestic corporate 
share of GDP can never exceed 100 percent.  Subject to numerous assumptions, the 
models presented here estimate that this source of corporate growth could be exhausted 
as early as the year 2032.  Given the lack of discussion of this issue in the relevant 
literature, it is unlikely that current stock valuations account for the eventual loss of this 
source of growth.  The actual effect on stock prices of such a slowdown of domestic 
corporate growth will depend not only on how far into the future such an event occurs, 
but also on how successful these corporations are at finding new growth opportunities 
overseas.  More research is needed to better model future growth patterns and to 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW ...........................................................................................3 
A. GDP AND CORPORATE DATA...................................................................3 
B. GDP GROWTH FORECASTS ......................................................................6 
C. CORPORATE VALUE-ADDED ACCOUNTING.......................................9 
D. CORPORATE GROWTH FORECASTS ...................................................10 
E. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATE AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH...............................................................................11 
III. METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................................13 
A. DATA SELECTION......................................................................................13 
B. MEASUREMENTS OF ECONOMIC AND CORPORATE 
GROWTH.......................................................................................................15 
C. FORECASTING FUTURE CHANGES IN THE CVA TO GDP 
RATIO ............................................................................................................21 
IV. FINDINGS..................................................................................................................23 
A. THE GROWTH OF THE CORPORATE SECTOR RELATIVE TO 
THE ECONOMY...........................................................................................23 
B. FORECASTING WHEN THE HISTORICAL TREND MUST END .....31 
C. SUMMARY OUTPUTS FOR SELECTED LINEAR REGRESSIONS...34 
V. STOCK MARKET IMPLICATIONS OF SLOWER CORPORATE 
GROWTH...................................................................................................................43 
A. BASIC STOCK VALUATIONS...................................................................43 
B. ISSUES AND ASSUMPTIONS ....................................................................45 
1. Dividend Payments, Dividend Growth and the Expected Rate 
of Return.............................................................................................45 
2. Are Markets Rational? ......................................................................48 
3. The Implications of Taxes on Valuations.........................................50 
4. Pricing the Entire Market .................................................................50 
5. Ownership Changes and the Survivor Bias.....................................52 
C. VALUING THE DOMESTIC CORPORATE MARKET.........................53 
D. THE IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE ASSUMPTIONS .............................57 
1. New Economy Growth.......................................................................57 
2. Changes in the Required Return......................................................59 
3. Changes to the Payout Ratio.............................................................60 
VI. CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................63 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................67 
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Corporate Share of GDP as Measured by Corporate Value Added.................23 
Figure 2. Correlation between CVA and GDP Annual Growth......................................24 
Figure 3. The Share of GDP Attributable to After-Tax Domestic Corporate Profits .....27 
Figure 4. After-tax Domestic Corporate Profits as a Percentage of CVA ......................28 
Figure 5. Share of Receipts by Business Type................................................................31 
Figure 6. U.S. Dividends Since 1929 ..............................................................................47 
Figure 7. Payout Ratios for U.S. Corporations Since 1940.............................................48 





























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Geometric Averages of GDP and CVA Growth..............................................25 
Table 2. Regression Estimates of GDP and CVA Growth ............................................26 
Table 3. U.S. Recessions Since 1929.............................................................................29 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to thank the many people who directly or indirectly made this work 
possible.  I thank Professor Henderson for not only humoring the crazy ideas of his 
students, but also for encouraging them through the donation of his precious time.  
Professor Hensel’s willingness to join this expedition ensured it remained on solid 
theoretical and technical ground, and for that I am most appreciative.  I also thank my 
friends for actively listening to years of ramblings that led to this project, my brother for 
finding the BEA data that got it started, and Christa for believing in me even when I 
didn’t.  Most of all I thank the heavens above for letting me be born into this great 
country, which for all of its faults is still by far the best place in the world for dreams and 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  1
I. INTRODUCTION 
In his book The New Industrial State, John Kenneth Galbraith mentions in passing 
that the five hundred largest corporations produced about half of the goods and services 
of the United States at that time.  He notes that while it seemed corporations were 
initially concentrated in industries requiring large amounts of capital and mass 
production, they were already—the book was published in 1967—entering nearly every 
segment of the American economy.  The statistics support his observations: over the last 
70 years, the share of gross domestic product in the U.S. attributable to corporations has 
slowly risen from about 50 percent in 1930 to almost 60 percent in 2005.   
Whether this trend is good or bad probably depends on the observer’s position 
and is therefore open to debate.  However, several points should be beyond argument.  
First, this expanding share of GDP has been a significant source of growth for 
corporations, allowing them to grow faster than the general rate of economic expansion.  
It certainly can be assumed this additional growth was profitable for the corporations and 
contributed therefore to both their bottom lines and their stock prices.  Second, while 
there is no reason to assume this trend will come to a halt anytime soon, it must be 
apparent that eventually it must end.  By definition, the corporate share of GDP cannot 
exceed 100 percent, and realistically it is likely to stabilize at some level below that. 
While these two facts might be obvious, there has been almost no discussion of 
this trend or its implications in the academic or professional literature.  This study is 
therefore an attempt to open that dialogue and ensure that the effects of this trend are both 
understood and anticipated.  It first tries to determine whether economic growth will 
actually at some point impose a limit on corporate growth.  Next, it attempts to forecast at 
what date the effects of that limit might be felt.  Finally, it explores the implications of 
such limits for valuations of corporate stocks. 
The study begins with a review of the available literature from the fields of 
economics, finance and accounting.  Available forecasts of economic and corporate 
growth from both governmental and private sources are presented, and the few instances 
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where the disparity between the two is noted are acknowledged.  Next, it presents a 
variety of methodologies that might be used to quantify the gap between corporate and 
economic growth and forecast the trend into the future.  The sources of data and 
underlying assumptions are also presented.  Third, it presents the findings generated with 
these methodologies, and offers estimates of when economic limits might begin to slow 
corporate growth according to the different models.  Fourth, it presents a review of stock 
valuation techniques and uses these techniques to explore the possible implications of 
slower corporate growth.  Finally, some brief conclusions are offered in conjunction with 
suggested areas for further research.   
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section contains a review of the relevant literature, broken into five sections.  
First, it highlights the sources of gross domestic product (GDP) and corporate value-
added (CVA) data used in this study.  Next, it reviews a variety of GDP forecasts offered 
by both government and private entities and individuals.  Third, it describes the limited 
literature available pertaining to corporate value-added accounting.  Fourth, it 
summarizes past discussions of corporate growth forecasts.  Finally, it details the 
instances where other authors mention the connections between economic and corporate 
growth which form the basis of this study. 
 
A. GDP AND CORPORATE DATA 
For both economic and corporate data, this study relies primarily upon 
information from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).  According to its website 
(www.bea.gov/bea/about/mission.html)1, the BEA strives to promote “a better 
understanding of the U.S. economy by providing the most timely, relevant, and accurate 
economic accounts data in an objective and cost-effective manner”.  It continually posts 
new data to its website as updates become available, and revises old data as new 
information surfaces and definitions and methodologies change.  Most of the data are 
presented by the BEA in tabular format.  While many different tables are referenced for 
this study, two in particular provide the majority of the data upon which this study is 
based.  Table 1.1.5., Gross Domestic Product, provides the annual GDP numbers from 
1929 through the present.  Table 1.14., Gross Value Added of Domestic Corporate 
Business in Current Dollars and Gross Value Added of Nonfinancial Domestic Corporate 
Business in Current and Chained Dollars, provides the corporate contribution to GDP in 
value-added format.   
In a study such as this, it is important to keep in mind three questions when 
choosing and examining the data.  First, what are the definitions and interpretations of the 
                                                 
1 Last accessed 3 December, 2006. 
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components under analysis?  Most introductory economics textbooks contain a general 
explanation of gross domestic product and the value-added accounting methods involved 
here.  Mankiw (2004) provides a thorough overview of the concepts, their importance, 
and how they are calculated.  Anderson (2002) provides a similar overview, but includes 
insight into relevant aspects like chained dollar versus nominal dollar formats.  He also 
provides a cursory overview of economic production from a historical context.  For a 
deeper investigation of GDP, the BEA itself provides a wealth of information.  On its 
website, the BEA provides a glossary of terms that provides simple definitions of the 
terms and components of GDP and value-added data.2  While this glossary provides 
general definitions, the interpretation of these items evolves over time.  As a result, the 
BEA publishes what it calls the “Comprehensive Revision of the National Income and 
Product Accounts” every four to five years to summarize the latest changes to the 
definitions and the calculations of the accounts.  The most recent of these was published 
in 2003. 
Once a definition of what is to be measured is established, the second relevant 
question is how well the data measure the intended target.  In its Survey of Current 
Business, the BEA publishes (among many other things) papers discussing the reliability 
of its own measures.  Fixler and Grimm (2002) define reliability in this context as a 
measure of the size of the revisions necessary over time.  They conclude that under this 
definition, early estimates are both reliable and useful.  They find that since 1980 
revisions to the quarterly estimates of annual GDP averaged just over one percent.  
Furthermore, they attribute the bulk of these changes to revisions of the concepts and 
methods involved rather than measurement error.   
Moulton (2000) describes not only how recent changes to said concepts and 
methods have improved the measures, but also what improvements are planned for the 
future.  He cites improvements to chain indices and recognition of software expenses as 
an investment as a few of the past successes, and better measurements of e-business and 
employee compensation among improvements expected in future revisions.  De Leeuw 
                                                 
2 For official definitions of many of the terms used here see the BEA’s glossary at 
http://www.bea.gov/bea/glossary/GlossaryIndex.htm, last accessed 20 November, 2006. 
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(1990) examines the reliability of gross national product (GNP) data, and finds that 
revisions since 1987 have averaged 1.7 percent.  Ehemann and Moulton (2001) explore 
the inconsistencies between product and income estimates of GDP.  They find that the 
discrepancy between the two peaked in 1993 at 1.0 percent of GDP, and that the income-
side measure of growth exceeded the product-side measure by 0.3 percentage points on 
average between 1993 and 2000.   
In their recent NBER working paper Corrado, Sichel and Hulten (2006) question 
whether the accounts accurately measure intangible investments.  They suggest that 
economists should reclassify expenditures on copyrights, brand marketing and training as 
investments rather than as expenses.  They argue that such a move could double 
investment as a percentage of GDP in the most extreme cases, and dramatically shift the 
share of GDP among the different components.   
Finally, Landefeld and Parker (1997) and Landefeld, Moulton and Vojtech (2003) 
explore the use and interpretation of chain indices in time-series economic data.  They 
cite improvements in BEA forecast accuracy as the primary benefit of using chain 
indices.  However, they also point out the limitations of these indices, such as the fact 
that they are not additive in nature. 
This study focuses on the relationship between the GDP and corporate data over 
time.  Therefore, the third important question is whether the two data sets are 
comparable.  The goal is to ensure that data for each are measured, calculated and 
reported using the same methodologies.  In the simplest of terms, the goal is to ensure 
that apples are compared to apples.  A review of available literature finds remarkably 
little discussion of whether GDP and CVA data are comparable.  The definition of “value 
added” from the BEA’s website suggests that the two are comparable in saying that value 
added is the “the contribution of an industry or sector to gross domestic product (GDP)”.  
While a review of the literature on corporate value added is presented later in this section, 
it should be worthwhile here to point out that very little has been written on the topic in 
the U.S.  Likewise, what has been written discusses the concept generally, not 
specifically addressing its use or measurement of U.S. GDP.  A phone call to the BEA 
expert on corporate profits, M. Gregory Key (April, 2006), provides the only 
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confirmation on this topic.  During the conversation, Key affirmed that the BEA’s  
statistics on corporate value added are directly comparable to GDP information, and form 
a subset of the overall GDP by representing the portion of GDP produced by corporate 
entities. 
 
B. GDP GROWTH FORECASTS 
In an exploration of whether GDP growth will serve as an upper bound to 
domestic corporate growth, the relative growth rates of each and the percentage of GDP 
constituted by corporate value added are the key measures under investigation.  Not only 
can domestic corporate value added not exceed GDP, but realistically there is some share 
less than one hundred percent at which point the corporate share will stabilize or begin to 
recede.  Therefore, accurately forecasting annual growth rates in the decades ahead is 
central to successfully estimating how soon a change must occur. 
While forecasts of U.S. GDP for the next quarter or year are plentiful, the number 
of forecasts available decreases rapidly as the timeframe considered expands.  As the 
period relevant to this study is better measured in decades than single years, a review of 
relevant forecasts becomes more manageable.  The largest producer of such estimates is 
the federal government.  For the ten to fifteen year horizon, no fewer than four agencies 
and organizations make forecasts about future economic growth.  These include the 
Council of Economic Advisors (CEA), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the 
Government Accounting Office (GAO), and the Social Security Administration (SSA).   
Additionally, the Federal Reserve Banks, Department of the Treasury and Department of 
Defense all discuss the question to some degree either independently or based upon the 
data of the first four organizations.   
In its most recent annual report, the CEA (2006) estimates that through 2011 real 
GDP growth will average between 3.1 and 3.3 percent annually.  They suggest this 
estimate presents the low end of possible outcomes as they believe it is based upon 
“conservative economic assumptions”.  This reflects their consensus that caution and 
prudence are desirable traits for such forecasts.  While specific estimates beyond 2011 are 
not cited, the report acknowledges that economic headwinds—such as low workforce 
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growth rates, steady to decreasing average hours worked, stable labor participation rates, 
and slowing productivity gains—suggest that their forecast beyond 2011 would not be 
any higher. 
Estimates outside the executive branch are similar for this timeframe, and become 
even more conservative as the horizon expands.  CBO (2006a) projections through 2011 
are largely in line with those of the CEA, forecasting annual GDP growth of 3.4 percent 
in 2007 slowly decreasing to 3.1 percent during the 2008-2011 timeframe.  However, its 
estimate drops to only 2.6 percent annually for the years 2012-2016.  As GAO estimates 
are based primarily upon the CBO’s other assumptions, it is no surprise that they reach 
the same conclusions about GDP growth during this timeframe. 
Perhaps no organization is as focused on examining long-term trends in the 
underlying economic factors as the SSA.  In fact, many of the other studies rely to some 
extent on SSA estimates of demographic characteristics.  These characteristics include 
fertility rates, life expectancies, immigration rates and labor force participation rates, 
among others.  They also estimate productivity gains, although these do not appear to 
have been explicitly incorporated into other agencies’ forecasts in the same fashion as the 
demographic data.  The SSA cites estimates of annual GDP growth of 2.6 percent for the 
period from 2005 through 2015, based largely on employment gains averaging 0.9 
percent per year and productivity increases of 1.7 percent annually.  It should be noted 
that the SSA takes these numbers from the “intermediate” of its three estimates.  Unlike 
the other organizations, it tries to highlight the risk inherent to its finances in the 
estimates by showing low, intermediate and high outcomes.  Average GDP growth is 
roughly 0.4 percentage points higher at 3.0 percent per year in its low-cost scenario. 
(Because it estimates net costs to the system, and higher GDP growth leads to higher tax 
revenues, it refers to the most optimistic growth scenario as the “low-cost” case).  
Likewise, GDP growth is about 0.4 percentage points lower at 2.2 percent in the high-
cost simulation.   
Of these government organizations, only the SSA ventures estimates beyond this 
midrange time horizon.  While the others limited their forecasts to 2016 at the latest, the 
most recent SSA report (Board of Trustees, 2006) offers forecasts for its three scenarios 
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out to 2080.  For the period 2020 through the year 2080, the low-cost scenario forecasts 
annual GDP in the range of 2.6 to 2.8 percent, the intermediate a range of 1.9 to 2.1 
percent, and the high cost a range of only 1.0 to 1.7 percent per year.   
It is of course desirable to compare these forecasts to those of academic and 
independent authors to see if any large disparities can be found.  A review of the 
literature finds two different but related approaches to estimating future economic growth 
on the non-governmental side.  One side tries to answer the question of how fast the 
economy can grow.  Economists such as Krugman (1997) and Blinder (1997) both 
predicted inherent limits on U.S. economic growth of 2.0 to 2.5 percent for the 
foreseeable future.  While the economy has consistently produced growth rates exceeding 
these numbers in the years since these works were published, it should be pointed out 
their arguments focus on sustainable long-term rates, and their estimates align 
considerably better with long-term government forecasts than they do with recent actual 
performance. 
In addition to discussions of how fast the economy might grow, the second 
approach taken replicates the approach taken by government organizations in estimating 
how fast the economy will grow.  Private estimates show a more varied range than the 
government estimates.  Global Insight (2005) estimates that real GDP growth will 
average 3.1 percent from 2005-2017.  Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) forecast growth of 
3.35% through 2010 for non-farm business.  They point out that their findings are quite 
consistent with the CBO’s estimate of 3.5% for that period.  Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh 
(2006) predict a range of 1.9 to 3.5 percent through 2015 for the economy as a whole, 
with their midrange estimate at 3.0 percent.  At the same time, the Economist Intelligence 
Unit, a research and data arm of The Economist, forecasts average growth of 2.7 percent 
over the next 25 years.  Hanson (2000) presents a long-term model that attempts to model 
world economic growth throughout human history using the sum of four exponentials.  
He offers a theory that current stock prices could be justified if the economy attains a 
higher level of sustainable productivity growth.  Jones (2002) does not present an actual 
forecast, but argues that 80 percent of recent economic growth is due to unsustainable 
factors.  He claims that the bulk of this growth was due to increases in research intensity 
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and educational levels.  Because these activities can not exceed 100 percent of economic 
activity, he suggests these changes are transitional and therefore will not continue 
indefinitely.   Similarly, Landefield and Fraumeni (2001) examine the impacts of 
technology on economic growth.  While they find computers and software are 
contributing significantly to economic growth, they do not find evidence supporting “new 
economy” theories of a radical jump in potential growth. 
 
C. CORPORATE VALUE-ADDED ACCOUNTING 
Any attempt to directly compare GDP and corporate numbers faces substantial 
difficulties from the start.  As Landefeld and Fraumeni (2001) point out, corporate sales 
data are substantially different from economic output measurements.  This is largely 
because traditional financial (corporate) accounting differs dramatically from the 
methods used by economists.  While corporate data focus on compliance with generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP), economic data focus on measuring the economic 
essence of what is happening.  For instance, GAAP handles the depreciation of assets in a 
variety of ways, many of which allow the asset to be depreciated faster than its useful 
life.  Analysts building GDP information must regularly adjust such numbers to better 
represent exactly how much of the useful life of the asset has been consumed.  Significant 
differences also exist in valuing inventories, the differences between sales and gross 
output, and the treatment of transfer payments.  Therefore, to make accurate comparisons 
it is necessary to first convert the sets of data into similar formats.  Value-added (VA) 
accounting essentially performs this task.  It takes corporate earnings statements and puts 
them in a form similar to that used by economists. 
Although value-added accounting never gained acceptance in the United States, it 
experienced a boom of sorts overseas in the 1970s.  Morley (1979) provides a review of 
its use and application in Britain.  He points out that one quarter of the top 100 British 
companies included VA statements in their annual reports at that time.  He cites some of 
the history of VA accounting (dating back to its use by the U.S. Treasury in the 
eighteenth century), discusses general calculation techniques, conversion of normal 
accounting entries to a VA format, and some advantages and disadvantages of the various 
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formats.  More recently, Evraert (1998) in France and Worthington and West (2001) in 
Australia offer reviews of the limited literature in the field. 
Several authors have found that VA statements, while infrequently used, do 
contain useful information.  Von Staden (2000) highlights their utility in illuminating the 
division of the created wealth among all of the stakeholders in a corporation.  The term 
“stakeholders” in this case is used in the limited sense, referring to those who provide 
value to the business process and are compensated for it.  This would include suppliers, 
management and labor, creditors, owners and possibly the government by way of taxes 
and subsidies.  Slightly more relevant to this paper are the works examining the 
predictive value of VA statements.  Both Riahi-Belkaoui (1999a) and Worthington and 
West (2004) suggest that measures of corporate value added are better predictors of 
future performance than traditional earnings statements.  Perhaps the most complete 
survey of the value-added landscape is Riahi-Belkaoui’s 1999 book Value added 
reporting and research: state of the art.  Not only does it cover all of the concepts 
discussed elsewhere, but it also includes reprints of many of the previously cited studies 
on this topic. 
While these works provide an excellent introduction to VA accounting, they are 
lacking in two areas relevant to this work.  First, all are focused on the use of value-added 
techniques at the corporate level.  None discuss using this data in any sort of aggregate 
above the individual company level.  Second, while speaking to VA concepts generally, 
none explain specifically how the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) computes 
value-added information.  For this type of information, the BEA’s Glossary and Survey of 
Current Business are the only sources.   
 
D. CORPORATE GROWTH FORECASTS 
As described in the last section, the virtual absence of value-added methodologies 
from corporate practice means that there is little coverage of corporate-growth forecasts 
in such terms—neither for single corporations nor in the aggregate.  However, a plethora 
of information discussing corporate forecasts in terms of earnings, dividend growth and 
the appreciation of corporate stock is available.  While different in their intent, units of 
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measurement and methodology, these studies do provide valuable insight on corporate 
growth from an alternative perspective.  With a few assumptions and some manipulation, 
at least rudimentary comparisons can be made between these and economic forecasts. 
Estimates of past returns provide a vantage point from which to begin discussions 
of future growth possibilities.  Ibbotson and Chen (2003) decompose returns between 
1926 and 2000 into subunits using six different methods.  In each case the overall 
geometric average return is 10.7 percent, with 3.08 percentage points of that attributable 
to inflation.  Shiller (1989) examines the slightly longer period between 1872 and 2000.  
Fama and French (2002) use this data to calculate an average real return of 7.43 percent, 
and discuss hypotheses as to why this return exceeds the amount forecasted by risk and 
return models.  The equity premium—the rate of return to stocks in excess of the risk-free 
rate—is the subject of numerous studies, including Graham and Harvey (2001) and Polk, 
Thompson and Vuolteenaho (2004).  Modigliani and Cohn (1979) and Campbell and 
Vuolteenaho (2004) explore the effects of inflation on stock prices and expected returns. 
Almost any corporate finance textbook explores the basic theory underlying stock 
pricing and forecasting earnings.  Brealy, Myers and Allen (2006) provide thorough 
coverage of these topics.  Beaver and Morse (1978) expand in detail on these ideas, and 
also suggest that differences in accounting method may account for the persistence of 
price-to-earnings ratio differences over the years.  
 
E. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATE AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH 
Thus far, the works reviewed generally focus on either the corporate or the 
economic realms, but few discuss the relationship between the two.  Although a work 
directly examining corporate value added as a percentage of GDP has yet to be found, 
several works at least either acknowledge the conceptual underpinnings of this paper’s 
argument or mention in passing that such a relationship ought to exist. 
Fair (2000) explores future corporate growth scenarios necessary to justify current 
stock prices.  He finds that most scenarios require highly optimistic assumptions, such as 
ten years of 14.2 percent annual earnings growth or a decade of productivity growth in 
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excess of 2.5 percent.  Of particular relevance to this study is his acknowledgement that 
nominal GDP growth of 6 percent, combined with 14.2 percent earnings growth, would 
increase the annual share of GDP going to profits to 11.9 percent within ten years.  While 
only a subset of the overall corporate value added, he points out that such a historically 
high ratio would probably never occur due to social and political forces.  While he limits 
his study to just the profits, his logic essentially mirrors that found later in this paper 
applied to the corporate sector as a whole.  Siegel (2002) picks up on this point, showing 
that corporate profits have ranged from 10.6 percent to -4.33 percent of national income 
since 1929.  He argues that in the long run profit growth must be limited to national 
income growth, lest it comrpise an ever-larger share of national income at the expense of 
the other stakeholders.  
Several other authors cite similar ideas under a variety of situations.  Hanson 
(2000) speaks in general terms regarding this concept.  He points out that generally as a 
subset grows as a percentage of the whole set, it is the slowing of the subset’s growth 
which usually restores the equilibrium rather than a long-term increase in the overall set’s 
growth rate.  Jones (2002) mentions this concept in the field of research.  He states that 
labor growth in this area is limited in the long run to overall labor growth because labor 
in this field can never exceed 100 percent of available labor.  Steurle and Spiro (1999) 
identify a similar situation in government spending on the elderly.  They point out that 
“No government program, no matter how important, can always grow faster than the 
economy and absorb an ever-increasing share of the nation’s output.”  While these two 
previous works cover topics very different from the one here, their logic should apply 
equally well to the economy and its corporate subset. Arnott (2004) mentions the issue in 
passing, taking the financial analysis industry to task for consistently forecasting earnings 
growth in excess of the economic growth rates generally seen as sustainable.   
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III. METHODOLOGY 
The ultimate goal of this study is to assess whether or not the corporate segment 
of the economy has historically grown faster than the economy as a whole.  Like most 
studies, it is first necessary to answer the two fundamental questions of what to measure 
and how best to measure it.  This section examines each question in turn, and provides 
insight into the author’s approach, reasoning, assumptions and methodologies. 
 
A. DATA SELECTION 
To draw comparisons between the corporate sector and the overall economy, one 
must first find relevant data for each segment and convert them into a format suitable for 
valid comparison.  As is often the case in such research, the possible approaches are 
many and each has its own merits and limitations.  For the overall economy one could 
look at the gross domestic or national products, the national or domestic incomes, or a 
host of other indices that attempt to capture the status of the national economy as a 
whole.  On the corporate side the options are equally numerous.  There are numerous 
profit, earnings, dividend and return measures that try to capture outcome from the 
perspective of the stockholders.  Additionally, there are others indicators like sales and 
value added that portray different images of the corporate sector.    
As the focus of this paper is upon corporate production and not profits or income, 
gross domestic product seems a better fit than gross domestic income.  Gross domestic 
product is chosen over gross national product simply because it is the format reported 
directly by the BEA.  GDP data were assembled, in nominal dollars, for the period 1929-
2005.  This information was drawn directly from the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA) website at www.bea.gov, Table 1.1.5 Gross Domestic Product.3   
An alternative approach would be to measure growth in inflation-adjusted format.  
Real GDP data are available from the BEA and are appealing as a potentially more 
accurate measure of the economy over time.  Nonetheless, this author ultimately elected 
                                                 
3 Last accessed 3 December, 2006. 
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not to use the data in this form due to concerns about its accuracy over long periods of 
time.  As Landefeld, Moutlon and Voutech (2003) point out, the BEA real GDP figures 
are computed used Fisher indexes, which take a geometric mean of a Laspeyeres index 
and a Paasche index.  The Laspeyeres index uses the prior year’s prices to capture 
changes in quantity produced, while the Passche index uses the later period’s prices to 
capture the change in production from the year prior.  As a combination of the two, the 
Fisher index does a better job of stripping out inflation over time.  However, this 
improvement comes at a price.  Because the Fisher index holds prices constant between 
periods, it cannot be used to accurately measure the share of any sub-component of GDP 
in dollar terms.  While the error is small for short periods with gradual changes, the 
problem is more pronounced over longer periods with rapidly falling prices.  It therefore 
is an important consideration for items such as computers and other technology-laden 
industries.  These industries are a major source of both corporate and economic growth 
(Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000).  While there are methods of reducing these effects to 
improve the real dollar figures, their complexity exceeds their utility for a work of this 
scope.  It is worthwhile to note, however, that the use of real dollar numbers as presented 
by the BEA would show an even more pronounced growth pattern of corporate value 
added as a share of GDP than the nominal data used here. 
Having chosen the data to represent the economy, it is necessary to next find 
corresponding data for the corporate sector.  While corporate performance is usually 
considered from either a sales or profit standpoint, neither perspective is sufficiently 
analogous with GDP to allow useful comparisons (Landefeld and Fraumeni, 2001).  
When aggregated across firms, sales data overstate the corporate case by essentially 
double counting portions of production.  An example may prove useful in illustrating the 
point.  Assume one corporation makes a car stereo, which it sells to another corporation 
that makes autos.  The second company then installs the stereo in one of its vehicles for 
sale to a consumer.  Sales data would capture the sale of the stereo to the second 




may be fine for some measures, it is not consistent with the format of GDP, which 
captures only the value added in the process.  Therefore a sales approach must be ruled 
out. 
The profits and earning data, on the other hand, understate the corporate case by 
capturing only the return to the stockholders.  GDP data paint a broader picture, including 
wages and benefits earned and accrued by workers, interest payments to bondholders, 
consumption of capital and so forth.  For that reason a broader measure of corporate 
performance is needed if fair comparisons are to be drawn between corporate activity and 
the economy. 
In the end, corporate value-added (CVA) data are used to represent the corporate 
side of the relationship.  While value-added approaches are not frequently discussed in 
the corporate literature, this method has two distinct advantages.  First and foremost, 
CVA information is calculated in the same fashion as GDP, making it the best measure 
by which to compare the corporate sector to the overall economy.  Second, this 
information is also tracked and disseminated by the BEA.  The fact that the BEA 
produces both datasets provides additional assurance that the methodologies used to 
produce each set are comparable.   
Nominal CVA data for the same period comes from the BEA website’s Table 
1.14 Gross Value Added of Domestic Corporate Business in Current Dollars and Gross 
Value Added of Nonfinancial Domestic Corporate Business in Current and Chained 
Dollars.  The table also includes chained-dollar measures of real CVA for the non-
financial sector, but these data are not focused upon because of the previously mentioned 
issues with chained indices. 
  
B. MEASUREMENTS OF ECONOMIC AND CORPORATE GROWTH 
When measuring the relative historical growth rates of the U.S. economy and its 
corporate sector and the evolving relationship between them, two approaches can be 
taken.  One avenue is to estimate each growth rate individually and then examine the 
difference between them.  Alternatively, it is possible to examine the changing proportion 
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of GDP supplied by the corporate sector over time, and then estimate the trend directly 
from this information.  Both approaches and their results are presented here. 
Similarly, within each approach several techniques exist to estimate the trends.  
The first is to just take an average of past changes as representative of the historical 
picture.   The merits of such an approach include both its simplicity and the frequency of 
its use in examining past growth rates of both economic and corporate performance.  The 
downsides are that it lacks some of the rigor of a more complex approach and that it 
provides only a point solution which lacks any measures of the level of confidence one 
has in its value as an estimator. 
A second approach is to subject the data to some form of regression analysis.  
This approach provides more robust information, to include levels of confidence and 
measures of how fully the model explains the measured outcomes.  It also allows the 
researcher to explore different hypotheses regarding what factors may drive (either in the 
causal or correlated sense) the results, and subsequently make statistical assessments of 
the relative merits of each hypothesis.  On the downside, such an approach can rapidly 
increase the complexity of the analysis by requiring the researcher to accurately identify 
and measure the factors that predict the dependent variable.   
As this author’s hope is merely to begin and not end the conversation on the 
relationship between corporate growth and the economy, both approaches are presented 
here with only minimal commentary on the merits or flaws of either.  It should be noted 
that each approach tells a similar story of corporate value added increasing as a 
percentage of the gross domestic product over time.  Only the pace of this trend changes 
between the models. 
One last consideration worth highlighting is the question of what data range ought 
to be included in the analysis.  The fact that the BEA has relevant data available only 
from 1929 through 2005 provides one limit.  Within this range a strong argument can be 
made that the entire set should be included.  This provides the widest view on the 
historical picture.  It also minimizes possible biasing caused by a researcher narrowing 
the scope to incorporate only evidence supporting his desired outcome.  On the other 
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hand, two events occurred during the first 15 years of available data that generally are 
regarded as the most unusual and perhaps unique events in modern American history: the 
Great Depression and World War II.  Both had profound impacts on the structure and 
growth of both the corporate sector and the overall economy.  Likewise, events of similar 
magnitude are considered unlikely in the future.  As a result, inclusion of their effects 
when attempting to estimate future events could distort the picture.  Therefore, it may be 
sensible to treat them as outliers and drop them from the data.    Rather than choose sides 
in such an argument, the researcher presents both approaches.  Finally, the even more 
limited timeframe of 1946 to 2001 is also analyzed.  While this range is selected simply 
to show the effects of choosing only the most favorable data range, it may also satisfy 
those who claim that the attacks on 9/11 and the ensuing war on terror are also aberrant 
events with significant impact on the data. 
To calculate average growth rates from the data, a geometric average across the 
relevant period is used.  To calculate the geometric growth rate over any period we can 
use the formula: 
 Xt = X0 * (1+g)t 
where Xt is the variable of interest in any period t, X0 is its value in the initial period, g is 
the growth rate to be calculated and t is the number of periods in question.  Solving for 
growth yields the equation 
 g = (Xt/X0)1/t - 1 
This approach is used to calculate the growth rates of both GDP and CVA over the three 
different selected timeframes.   
An alternate approach to estimating growth is to use regression analysis.  The 
simplest model is constructed with time as the independent variable and the size of the 
corporate sector or overall economy in any given year as the dependent variable.  For 
simplicity, the first year in any given sample is labeled as year 1, with subsequent years 
numbered consecutively after that.  To account for the compounding effects of growth, a 
power relationship is assumed.  Therefore, the value of the dependent variable (usually 
either GDP or CVA) in any year can be predicted as a combination of an initial value (the 
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intercept) times the growth rate (here portrayed as G to minimize confusion between 
models) to a power representing the number of periods which have passed since the 
initial point.  Mathematically this simplest case can be written as 
Yt = Y0 * (G)t 
The equation can be converted to a linear relationship by taking the natural logarithm of 
both sides: 
 ln(Yt) = ln(Y0) + t *  ln(G) 
To simplify notation, Y’t is used to represent ln(Y(t)), Y0’ in place of ln(Y0) and G’ in 
lieu of ln(G).  The equation therefore can be written as 
 Y’t = Y0’ + G’ * t 
which is linear and can be estimated with a standard least squares regression.  The years 
covered in the sample are plugged in as the independent variables, while the logs of the 
size of the economy or corporate sector in each year are inserted as the dependent 
variables.  The regression analysis provides an estimate of G’, which is the log of the 
annual growth rate.  The analysis also provides estimates of the goodness of fit of the 
model overall, and levels of confidence in the estimates.  This approach is used to 
estimate the historical growth rates of both GDP and CVA using data for all three data 
ranges.   
Such simple models are certainly open to criticism, particularly that they do not 
incorporate factors likely to drive the growth rates of both GDP and CVA.  Factors like 
inflation, population growth and productivity improvements are all known to play 
significant roles in nominal and/or real growth.  However, all of these are likely to affect 
both economic and corporate growth in similar fashions.  If the effects are comparable on 
both CVA and GDP, they will cancel each other out when looking at the ratio of the two.  
The case is most easily seen with inflation.  The ratio of nominal corporate value added 
to nominal gross domestic product should be the same as the ratio of real corporate value 
added to real gross domestic product for any given period.  Therefore, as long as there is 
no reason to suspect that inflation affects corporate growth differently than economic 
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growth, its impact on this study ought to be negligible and it may ignored.  While perhaps 
less obvious, the arguments for excluding demographic trends and productivity changes 
are similar.  There is little compelling evidence that either of these affects corporate 
activities in a vastly different manner than the overall economy. 
There are two additional limitations related to more complex multivariate models 
that argue against their use here.  First, the search is still ongoing for a model that can 
accurately forecast growth.  Any attempt here to undertake this extremely complex 
endeavor risks digressing into this separate but related field and never returning.  It is 
therefore left to future works to determine to what extent more complex models will be 
able to improve upon the estimates found here.  A second limitation is the fact that these 
more robust models tend to be built for forecasting growth in months or at best years 
ahead, while the timeframes of relevance here are decades and even centuries.  Effective 
use of models dependent upon a host of variables will be hampered by the inability to 
forecast these variables beyond the near future. 
Despite these concerns, several multivariate models are considered here.  The first 
addresses the issue of whether or not the growth trends are different during periods of 
recession and war.  If so, anyone trying to forecast growth using one of these models 
must decide whether or not he expects similar downturns and periods of war in the future, 
because inclusion or exclusion would alter the forecast.  It seems reasonable to 
hypothesize that growth for both the overall economy and the corporate sector are 
fundamentally different during periods of recession and periods of war, and that these 
effects might not be the same on GDP as they are on CVA.  For instance, government 
production might be expected to increase faster than corporate production during a 
wartime mobilization of the economy, while government activity may not decrease as 
rapidly as corporate activity during periods of recession.  Therefore, two dummy 
variables are added to differentiate these cases.   
To examine this more complex picture, the data must be approached from another 
angle.  The simple regressions modeled constant growth and looked at the change in size 
of the economy or corporate sector over time.  However, the inclusion of dummy 
variables picks up differences in growth between periods with and without these events.  
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It does not easily portray their cumulative effects.  To accommodate these differences, 
instead of trying to forecast the size of GDP or CVA in any period, it is easier instead 
examine the annual change in the ratio of CVA to GDP, noted here as Gt.  In this case the 
change in the ratio for any given year is 
Gt = (CVAt/GDPt)-(CVAt-1/GDPt-1) 
where CVAi and GDPi are the nominal values of corporate value added and gross 
domestic product for year i.  A regression analysis can assess whether changes to the ratio 
can be represented with a simple linear model.  The model estimates the change in the 
ratio as 
G’t = G0 + GT * t 
where G’t is the regression estimate of the ratio of CVA to GDP for any year t, G0 is the 
year 0 change in the ratio (the regression intercept), and GT is the estimate of the effect 
of time on the trend (the coefficient of the independent variable).  If GT is significant, it 
tells how much that change is accelerating or slowing with time. 
From this starting point two new independent variables are introduced to assess 
whether or not the changes to the ratio are different during periods of war and recession 
than in other years.  The model assumes that the change in any year t will consist of a 
baseline change (the intercept), any trend in the changes over time, and adjustments for 
recession and wartime conditions.  This model assumes the form 
 Gt = G0 + W * DW(t) + R * DR(t) + GT*t 
DW and DR are dummy variables that assume values of 0 if that event (DW for war and DR 
for recession respectively) is not occurring, and 1 if it is.  W and R then represent the 
regression coefficients for these dummy variables.  They indicate how strongly these 
events affect the changes in the ratio, and can be assessed for statistical significance.  If 
the intercept coefficient G0 is non-zero and significant, it again suggests that the ratio of 
CVA to GDP is in fact changing over time independent of war and recession.  The rate  
of these changes is increasing if the coefficient GT is positive and is decreasing if GT is 
negative.   
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The last factor considered here is the serial correlation of the data.  It is clear that 
growth in any year is not truly independent of growth in the previous period or periods.  
Both intuition and a review of the GDP and CVA datasets suggest that growth during any 
period may be strongly influenced by previous period growth.  Likewise, it may be 
possible that changes in the ratio itself are affected by the changes that closely preceded 
it.  A regression is run to explore the severity of this impact of changes in one period on 
changes in subsequent periods.  Growth in this case is estimated as 
 Gt = G0 + RC1 * Gt-1 + RC2 * Gt-2 + … + RCi * Gt-i 
where RCi is the regression coefficient reflecting the impact of growth from the period i 
years prior to the current period.   
 
C. FORECASTING FUTURE CHANGES IN THE CVA TO GDP RATIO 
Regardless of the model used, the findings in the next section will show that the 
corporate sector has in fact grown faster than the overall economy during all periods 
considered.  Whether or not this strikes the reader as obvious, it should be apparent that 
such a trend cannot continue indefinitely.  At some point the share of the economy 
contributed by the corporate sector must stabilize or even reverse, as CVA can never be 
more than 100 percent of GDP.  Mathematically speaking, if A is truly and by necessity a 
subset of B, A can not indefinitely grow at a rate faster than B.  By definition, corporate 
value added represents the subset of gross domestic product produced by the corporate 
sector.  Therefore, its growth on average cannot exceed that of the overall economy in the 
long run. 
Given this fact, it is useful to explore possible timeframes at which point the 
trends of the last 75 years must give way, and either GDP growth must accelerate or 
CVA growth must decline.  If one assumes that GDP and CVA will initially continue to 
grow at their historical rates, it is possible to calculate the horizon before which these 
rates must change under a variety of estimates of the maximum share of GDP that can 
come from CVA.  When modeling GDP and CVA by simple regression or a geometric 
average, estimates of the future values of either can be stated in the form 
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GDPt = GDP0 (GGDP)t, and 
CVAt = CVA0 (GCVA)t 
where GGDP and GCVA are the estimated annual growth rates of gross domestic product 
and corporate value added.  As mentioned already, by definition CVA can never be more 
than 100 percent of GDP.  Therefore 
CVAt / GDPt ≤ 1 for all t 
In reality, the share of GDP that comes from CVA is likely to be limited to some 
amount less than 100 percent.  Sole proprietorships, partnerships and government are 
likely to always make some contributions to GDP.  For any percentage PMAX chosen as 
the maximum feasible share of GDP contributed by CVA, the year T in which that share 
would be reached if historical growth rates continue can be calculated as follows: 
PMAX = CVAT / GDPT 
PMAX =  CVA0 (GCVA)T / GDP0 (GGDP)T  
PMAX * GDP0/CVA0 = (GCVA/GGDP)T   
T = ln[PMAX * GDP0/CVA0] / ln(GCVA/GGDP)  
A variety of estimates of the highest level of economic output that can come from the 
corporate sector are presented.  These estimates are then used in conjunction with this last 
equation to calculate points in the future beyond which the different models’ estimates of 




A. THE GROWTH OF THE CORPORATE SECTOR RELATIVE TO THE 
ECONOMY 
The share of GDP contributed by CVA over the entire period from 1929 through 
2005 is shown in Figure 1.  It can be seen that the corporate share of GDP grew from 
52.5 percent in 1929 to 59.7 percent in 2005.  If the decision is made to exclude data 
prior to 1945 as outliers, the change is even more dramatic.  CVA jumps from 44.6 
percent of GDP in 1945 to 59.7 percent in 2005.  Likewise, for those who argue that the 
U.S. has again been at war since 2001 and therefore the most recent years should be 
excluded, the range from 1945 through 2000 moves from the all-time low at 44.6 percent 
to the all-time high of 61.6 percent in 2000.  While there have been periods where CVA 
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Figure 1.   Corporate Share of GDP as Measured by Corporate Value Added 
 
 
A regression analysis of the data depicted in Figure 1 verifies the visual effect.  A 
linear regression of the ratio of CVA to GDP over time is significant at better than a 99 
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percent level of confidence, and the best fit estimate of the time coefficient suggests the 
ratio is increasing by 0.16 percentage points each year.4   
Figure 2 shows the strong correlation between annual growth in CVA and that in 
GDP.  The correlation coefficient between these numbers is 0.95.  This relationship 
exhibits the widely acknowledged link between corporate growth and economic 
expansion.  Running a regression with annual GDP growth as the independent variable 
and annual CVA growth as the dependent variable supports the picture painted thus far.  
While the intercept is not statistically different from zero, the coefficient is statistically 
greater than one.  This supports the notion that at all levels of expansion, corporate 
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Figure 2.   Correlation between CVA and GDP Annual Growth 
 
 
                                                 
4 Regression summaries for most of the regressions presented in this section can be found at the end of 
the chapter. 
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Using the methodologies described in the previous section, the historical 
(geometric) average growth rates were also calculated for the three different periods.  A 
summary of these results is shown in Table 1.  For the entire 76-year period, CVA grew 
annually only 0.18 percentage points faster than GDP, with an annual average growth 
rate of 6.69 percent versus 6.51 percent for GDP.  Still, even this small margin allowed 
CVA to capture an additional 7.2 percentage points of GDP over that time. 
The profound effects of the Great Depression and World War II can be seen in the 
second case where these events are excluded by limiting the range to 1945-2005.  While 
average GDP and CVA growth are both higher, the effect is much more significant for 
CVA.  This allows the average annual difference between them to almost triple to 0.52 
percentage points and explains how CVA increases its share of GDP by 15.1 percentage 
points over a period that is 16 years shorter.  If one excludes the last four years and limits 
the range to 1945-2000, the effect is even more pronounced.  The growth rate of CVA 




Number of Years in Sample 76 60 55
GDP Geometric Average 6.51% 6.94% 7.12%
CVA Geometric Average 6.69% 7.46% 7.75%




Table 1.   Geometric Averages of GDP and CVA Growth 
 
The regression models used to estimate the annual growth rates of CVA and GDP 
individually yield similar, if slightly less dramatic, results.  Every log-linear model of 
either CVA or GDP has an adjusted R-squared over 0.99, and the models all satisfy F and 
t-tests at normal confidence levels.  Table 2 below summarizes the GDP and CVA 
growth coefficients estimated by the simple regressions.  Interestingly, the most 
significant growth disparity now occurs based upon the 1929-2005 data range, whereas 




Number of Years in Sample 76 59 54
GDP Growth Coefficient 7.59% 7.49% 7.67%
CVA Growth Coefficient 7.90% 7.72% 7.95%
Differential 0.31% 0.23% 0.28%
Years Included
 
Table 2.   Regression Estimates of GDP and CVA Growth 
 
Regardless of the range of years included or the choice of a geometric average or 
regression estimate, the models clearly depict a situation where corporate growth is 
outrunning economic growth.  As a result, the corporate sector’s share of the economy is 
growing.  Depending upon the choice of time period and model, CVA growth has 
exceeded that of GDP by between 2.8 percent and 8.1 percent.  These results are 
surprising given the findings of other authors that earnings and profits as a percentage of 
the economy have not grown substantially.5  An examination of the BEA data by this 
author produced similar findings regarding profits.  With inventory and depreciation 
adjustments, after-tax profits have ranged from a high of 7.53 percent of GDP in 1929 to 
a low of -2.48 percent in 1933.  Limiting the set to the years after World War II narrows 
the range of values.  Profit’s share of GDP peaks at 6.43 percent in 1965, and falls to a 
much-improved low 2.31 percent in 1974.  A chart of the entire period is shown below in 
Figure 3.   
 
 
                                                 
5 For example, see Siegel (2002) or Shiller (2005) for discussions of corporate profits as a share of 


























Figure 3.   The Share of GDP Attributable to After-Tax Domestic Corporate Profits 
 
An examination of the data yields several noteworthy points.  First, the growing 
share of GDP that comes from the corporate sector seen in Figure 1 is not reflected in a 
corresponding increase in the profits of the corporate sector as a percentage of GDP here 
in Figure 3.  While cyclical trends are clearly visible, no long-term trend is apparent.  A 
regression of profits as a share of GDP over time shows the coefficient of the time 
variable to be essentially zero and of no statistical significance.  This would suggest that 
profits as a percentage of GDP are exhibiting no long-term trend beyond random or 
cyclical variations. However, when the years before 1946 are again excluded, a 
statistically-significant trend does emerge.  Surprisingly, it is a negative trend, implying 
that profits as a percentage of GDP are actually decreasing.  For corporate value-added to 
be increasing its share of gross domestic product while profits are remaining steady or 
even decreasing as a share of GDP, by default corporate profits as a percentage of CVA 
must also be decreasing.  Figure 4 depicts the data.  While profits have indeed been a 
lower share of CVA in recent decades, the graph appears to suggest more of a sharp drop 
























Figure 4.   After-tax Domestic Corporate Profits as a Percentage of CVA 
 
For 42 of the 76 years covered in the data, corporate value added has grown as a 
share of gross domestic product.  A closer investigation of the exceptions yields several 
interesting points.  Fifteen of the 34 years during which this ratio decreased included at 
least one quarter during which the U.S. was officially in a recession.  Table 4 shows all of 
the U.S. recessions since 1929.  Coincidentally, fifteen exceptions are also found during 
wartime.  World War II and the Korean War account for six of them (1942, 1943, 1944, 
1945, 1952 and 1953), while the more recent conflicts overlap with other periods of 
decline.  Vietnam coincided with three of the years (1967, 1970 and 1971). The first Gulf 
War overlapped two more (1990 and 1991).  If one accepts the war on terror as a true war 
in terms of its effects on economic and corporate growth then the decreases of the last 
four years (2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004) can also be accounted for in this manner.   
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Length of Recession  
Dates of Recession (months)
August 1929 - March 1933 44
May 1937 - June 1938 14
February 1945 - October 1945 9
November 1948 - October 1949 12
July 1953 - May 1954 11
August 1957 - April 1958 9
April 1960 - February 1961 11
December 1969 - November 1970 12
November 1973 - March 1975 17
January 1980 - July 1980 7
July 1981 - November 1982 17
July 1990 - March 1991 9
March 2001 - November 2001 9  
Table 3.   U.S. Recessions Since 1929 
 
A multivariate regression confirms these casual observations.  While the 
regression only has an adjusted R-squared of about 0.32, the coefficients of both dummy 
variables and the time variable are all significant at better than 95 percent.  When the 
effects of periods of war and recession are stripped from the data through the use of the 
dummy variables, corporate value added increases its share of gross domestic product by 
just over one percentage point annually.  However, in recession years the effect is exactly 
the opposite: CVA’s share of GDP declines by a similar amount.  The impact of war is 
even more significant, with CVA losing two percentage points of GDP during wartime.  
If the years prior to 1946 are removed to exclude the particularly dramatic effects of the 
Great Depression and the Second World War, only the coefficient for the war variable is 
dramatically changed.  The change associated with war is essentially cut in half, from a 
two percentage point decrease to just under a one percent decrease.  Interestingly, the 
time variable shows an extremely small—one to two one-hundredths of a percentage 
point—slowing of the trend over time in all of these multivariate models.    
The importance of separating the effects of war and recession from the underlying 
trends depends upon whether or not these events—recession and war—are unusual and 
therefore unlikely to reoccur in the future.  If so, the effects of these years can be 
removed from the forecasts of future corporate and economic growth, and CVA’s growth 
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as a percentage of GDP will be faster.  On the other hand, if such events are inevitable 
parts of the world, their impact cannot be excluded and the rate of change remains as 
forecasted earlier.  Similar arguments can be made for and against the more limited 
approach of simply excluding the most dramatic of these events, most likely World War 
II and the Great Depression.  While the likelihood of a war or recession on a scale 
comparable to these events is certainly less than that of minor conflicts or economic 
pullbacks, the arguments for and against including them are similar and still ultimately 
depend upon judgments that cannot be known with any degree of certainty. 
The effects of serial correlation on the changes in the ratio of corporate value 
added to gross domestic product were also examined at lags out to six years.  While the 
effects of the periods one and two years prior are consistently significant (for the models 
including data up to four years prior) at greater than a 90 percent confidence level, the 
impact of the third year prior is not statistically significant in any of the models.  It is 
noteworthy that the positive impact any period’s change in the ratio has one year later is 
almost exactly counterbalanced by its negative impact one year after that.  These results 
suggest that while serial correlation is present in the data, its effects are predominantly 
felt in the near term.    
This author was unable to find a single mention of this phenomenon—the 
growing share of economic output represented by corporate value added—in the relevant 
literature.  This may be due to the fact that in the U.S. the term “value added” is used 
mostly in its general sense: to describe the efforts of firms to meet the needs of the 
marketplace in ever more innovative and efficient manners.  The absence of its specific 
use as a corporate accounting term may have allowed this trend to quietly continue 
without attracting much attention.  Furthermore, the trend is somewhat obvious: most 
people who have lived in the United States for any portion of this time period could attest 
to the growing role of corporations in the production of goods and services in this 
country.  Large corporate players have entered almost every aspect of the economy, and 
have assumed prominent if not dominant roles in most.  Figure 5 below shows the 
dominant position the corporate sector has maintained for over 40 years now.  According 
to data from the Statistical Abstract of the United States, corporate entities have 
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accounted for over 80 percent of U.S. business receipts since 1965.  Therefore it is 
possible this transformation of the economy may have simply been taken as a given and, 




























Figure 5.   Share of Receipts by Business Type 
 
 
B. FORECASTING WHEN THE HISTORICAL TREND MUST END 
If the trend over the last century is considered obvious, it should be equally 
obvious that it can not continue indefinitely.  Fundamental rules regarding sets preclude 
this.  Simply stated, if A is truly and by necessity a subset of B, A can not indefinitely 
grow at a rate faster than B if A and B and their respective growth rates are all positive 
numbers.  This is written mathematically as 
 A0*(1+ra)t ≤ B0*(1+rb)t 
where A0 and B0 are the initial values of A and B and ra and rb are the growths rate of A 
and B.  It holds that if A0, B0, ra and rb are all positive numbers, the inequality can not 
hold indefinitely if ra is larger than rb.  If the initial values of A and B are known and the  
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growth rates are held constant, the exact time t at which point the inequality is violated 
can be solved for.  By taking the natural log of both sides and then separating t, this point 
t is found to be 
    t = ln(A/B)/ln[(1+ rb)/(1+ra)] 
Estimates of when corporate value added would reach 70, 80, 90 and 100 percent 
of gross domestic product were thus calculated using the various geometric and 
regression models of growth.  A summary of the estimates is contained below in Table 3. 
 
Method of Estimate (Years Included) 70% 80% 90% 100%
Separate Regressions (1929-2005) 2061 2108 2149 2186
Separate Regressions (1946-2005) 2081 2144 2200 2250
Separate Regressions (1946-2001) 2067 2120 2166 2207
Combined Regressions (1929-2005) 2071 2135 2199 2263
Combined Regressions (1946-2005) 2086 2166 2245 2324
Combined Regressions (1946-2001) 2077 2146 2216 2285
Separate Geometric Average (1929-2005) 2099 2178 2248 2311
Separate Geometric Average (1946-2005) 2038 2066 2090 2112
Separate Geometric Average (1946-2001) 2032 2055 2075 2093
Estimated Year in Which CVA
Reaches Specified Share of GDP
 
 
Table 4.   Estimated Year CVA Reaches Maximum Share of GDP 
 
The fact that CVA growth exceeds GDP growth in every model suggests that 
corporate growth has come from two separate sources.  First, the overall expansion of the 
economic pie has allowed the corporate sector’s slice of it to grow at a rate 
commensurate to GDP growth.  Second, the corporate sector has been growing relative to 
the other components.  In effect, this extra annual growth has come at the expense of the 
non-corporate segments.  As the corporate sector’s share approaches 100 percent of 
economic production, this latter source of growth must, by definition, come to an end.  
Upon reaching that point, the only source still available for corporate growth would be 
the former, and therefore corporate growth would be limited to the overall growth rate of 
the economy.  Furthermore, it should be apparent that the stabilization point—the point at 
which corporate growth depends solely upon economic expansion and not upon 
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increasing its factor share—will come long before it actually reaches 100 percent of 
economic production.  The two other main contributors to the economy, namely 
government and non-corporate business, are not going to completely disappear.  
Therefore, Table 3 includes estimates for ratios less than 100 percent.  For example, if 70 
percent is a more realistic estimate of the maximum corporate share of the economy, the 
models suggest this limit could be reached between as early as 2032 but no later than 
2099. 
It should be noted that the discussion thus far has been limited to both the 
corporate and economic production of the United States.  As the prominence of the U.S. 
economy shrinks relative to the overall world economy, there is and should continue to 
be substantial room for corporate growth around the globe.  At the same time, U.S. 
corporations will face an ever-expanding group of competitors in both overseas and 
domestic markets. It is impossible to say with certainty what effect these two opposing 
forces will have on the study presented here.  While the impact of these international 
effects will figure prominently in the long-term prospects of individual corporations, the 
goal of this project was merely to examine the outlook on the domestic front in its 
aggregate.  This issue is addressed a bit more fully in the next chapter on stock 
valuations, but more research on this topic needs to be done.  Nonetheless, it should be 
noted that ultimately global corporate growth will face a similar ceiling—global 
economic growth.  While both the size and horizon may be very different, the results and 











C. SUMMARY OUTPUTS FOR SELECTED LINEAR REGRESSIONS 
 
1929-2005
Regression ln(GDP) vs. ln(time) base year 1929 = 1
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics Base GDP = 54.36996073
Multiple R 0.995418889 Growth rate = 1.075935338
R Square 0.990858764




df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 203.7630809 203.7630809 8129.579595 3.18118E-78
Residual 75 1.879830425 0.025064406
Total 76 205.6429113
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 3.995811809 0.03643824 109.6598462 1.49363E-84 3.923223113 4.068 3.923223113 4.068400505





Regression In(GDP) vs. ln(time) base year 1946 = 1
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics Base GDP  = 195.6429041
Multiple R 0.996139598 Growth rate = 1.074938782
R Square 0.992294099




df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 93.97068525 93.97068525 7468.699235 5.46836E-63
Residual 58 0.729752206 0.012581935
Total 59 94.70043745
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 5.27629108 0.029327819 179.9073817 2.20167E-81 5.217585073 5.334997087 5.217585073 5.334997087




Regression ln(CVA) vs. ln(time) base year 1929 = 1
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics Base CVA = 27.15859076
Multiple R 0.995203452 Growth rate = 1.079009649
R Square 0.990429911




df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 219.9598122 219.9598122 7761.918044 1.77559E-77
Residual 75 2.125374916 0.028338332
Total 76 222.0851871
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 3.301693415 0.038745015 85.21595427 2.10631E-76 3.224509388 3.378877441 3.224509388 3.378877441





Regression ln(CVA) vs. ln(time) base year 1946 = 1
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics Base CVA = 29.8439911
Multiple R 0.995861926 Growth rate = 1.07720352
R Square 0.991740975




df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 94.62944514 94.62944514 6844.541051 4.53219E-61
Residual 57 0.788055522 0.013825535
Total 58 95.41750066
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 3.395983516 0.045782654 74.1762053 2.15796E-58 3.304305335 3.487661698 3.304305335 3.487661698





Regression ln(CVA) vs. ln(time) base year 1946 = 1
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics Base CVA = 101.0977854
Multiple R 0.996556559 Growth rate = 1.079460815
R Square 0.993124976




df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 81.03092521 81.03092521 7656.06399 5.33291E-59
Residual 53 0.560946074 0.010583888
Total 54 81.59187128
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 4.616088221 0.028126836 164.1168665 2.02177E-73 4.559672933 4.672503509 4.559672933 4.672503509














df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.09290823 0.09290823 235.5717518 7.58451E-25
Residual 75 0.029579596 0.000394395
Total 76 0.122487826
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.498846513 0.004570821 109.1371895 2.13256E-84 0.489740971 0.507952054 0.489740971 0.507952054














df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.02876639 0.02876639 117.5025231 1.43602E-15
Residual 58 0.014199275 0.000244815
Total 59 0.042965665
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.53714063 0.004090959 131.2994372 1.80686E-73 0.528951685 0.545329574 0.528951685 0.545329574














df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.028614615 0.028614615 123.6153616 1.81536E-15
Residual 53 0.012268496 0.000231481
Total 54 0.040883111
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.533742229 0.004159642 128.3144509 9.03949E-68 0.525399043 0.542085415 0.525399043 0.542085415













df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 4.48612E-06 4.48612E-06 0.020311674 0.887052227
Residual 75 0.016564813 0.000220864
Total 76 0.016569299
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.04888391 0.003420514 14.29139488 4.16137E-23 0.042069898 0.055697923 0.042069898 0.055697923
time -1.08599E-05 7.61998E-05 -0.142519032 0.887052227 -0.000162658 0.000140938 -0.000162658 0.000140938
 
 









df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.000427474 0.000427474 4.620425931 0.035777036
Residual 58 0.005366068 9.25184E-05
Total 59 0.005793542
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.054029103 0.002514897 21.48362872 2.6882E-29 0.048994991 0.059063216 0.048994991 0.059063216














df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.00207099 0.00207099 2.707547591 0.104059321
Residual 75 0.057367125 0.000764895
Total 76 0.059438115
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.095712536 0.006365457 15.03623906 2.43829E-24 0.083031895 0.108393176 0.083031895 0.108393176
time -0.000233335 0.000141805 -1.645462729 0.104059321 -0.000515826 4.91553E-05 -0.000515826 4.91553E-05
 
 









df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.003884559 0.003884559 13.84322506 0.000450571
Residual 58 0.016275429 0.000280611
Total 59 0.020159988
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.100206846 0.00437984 22.87910962 1.02058E-30 0.091439643 0.108974049 0.091439643 0.108974049














df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.496809778 0.496809778 707.6015417 1.28225E-39
Residual 74 0.051955686 0.000702104
Total 75 0.548765464
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept -0.005401699 0.004169763 -1.295445221 0.199193334 -0.013710132 0.002906734 -0.013710132 0.002906734













df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.000854339 0.000854339 4.957744802 0.029059462
Residual 73 0.012579656 0.000172324
Total 74 0.013433995
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.000755332 0.001518904 0.497287335 0.620480973 -0.002271839 0.003782503 -0.002271839 0.003782503













df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 2 0.001954526 0.000977263 6.772550519 0.002032504
Residual 71 0.010245133 0.000144298
Total 73 0.012199659
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.00142353 0.001401194 1.015940897 0.313107113 -0.001370371 0.004217432 -0.001370371 0.004217432
t-1 0.324108961 0.107331706 3.019694494 0.003514251 0.110095621 0.538122301 0.110095621 0.538122301













df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 3 0.001766822 0.000588941 4.109167436 0.009646877
Residual 69 0.009889328 0.000143324
Total 72 0.01165615
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.001778011 0.001415491 1.25610876 0.213313009 -0.001045817 0.004601839 -0.001045817 0.004601839
t-1 0.243960426 0.11845265 2.059560729 0.043215714 0.007653858 0.480266994 0.007653858 0.480266994
t-2 -0.250285409 0.1136681 -2.201896642 0.031018192 -0.477047062 -0.023523756 -0.477047062 -0.023523756













df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 3 0.00468375 0.00156125 12.84101816 8.25041E-07
Residual 72 0.008753979 0.000121583
Total 75 0.013437728
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.012197518 0.003143883 3.879762548 0.000229118 0.005930303 0.018464733 0.005930303 0.018464733
War -0.020286541 0.00459441 -4.415483862 3.4784E-05 -0.029445329 -0.011127753 -0.029445329 -0.011127753
Recession -0.013359406 0.002833919 -4.714110853 1.1547E-05 -0.01900872 -0.007710093 -0.01900872 -0.007710093













df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 3 0.0019715 0.000657167 9.459706126 3.74928E-05
Residual 56 0.003890326 6.94701E-05
Total 59 0.005861826
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.013391741 0.002543117 5.265877053 2.29363E-06 0.008297266 0.018486216 0.008297266 0.018486216
War -0.008998474 0.005195907 -1.731838732 0.08880796 -0.019407127 0.00141018 -0.019407127 0.00141018
Recession -0.010352002 0.002463973 -4.201345548 9.61827E-05 -0.015287933 -0.005416071 -0.015287933 -0.005416071
Time -0.000251795 6.61677E-05 -3.805414173 0.000352715 -0.000384345 -0.000119246 -0.000384345 -0.000119246  
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V. STOCK MARKET IMPLICATIONS OF SLOWER 
CORPORATE GROWTH 
The previous chapter examined historical growth rates of the corporate and 
national accounts from a value-added perspective and explored theoretical time horizons 
at which domestic corporate growth would on average be limited to that of the overall 
economy.  This chapter explores the resulting question likely to be on every investor’s 
mind: “What do these findings mean for stock market valuations and investing?”  It 
opens with a basic review of stock valuations, discusses the assumptions needed to apply 
this model to the topics at hand, calculates the implications of these findings for stock 
valuations, and then presents a few conclusions about what effects different sets of 
assumptions might have. 
 
A. BASIC STOCK VALUATIONS 
For any equity investment in a corporate entity, the return to the investor is the 
summation of two components: the dividend payments and the appreciation of the 
investment captured at the time of sale.  The return to the investor is therefore the sum of 
these cashflows denoted as 
 Cashflows to Investor = D1 + D2 + D3 + … + Dt + PT 
where Dt is the dividend payment made in any period t and PT is the price the stock can 
be sold for in the last period T.  Because these inflows occur over time, and a dollar 
tomorrow is less valuable than a dollar today, the cash to the investor must be discounted 
by the time value of money r.  This is also known as the opportunity cost of capital, 
which represents the return the investor might have gotten elsewhere, and the minimum 
compensation he requires for giving up the use of his money.  By discounting these 
payments, the fair price of the stock P—ignoring taxes and certain other complicating 
factors—is found to be 
P =  D1/(1+r) + D2/(1+r)2 + D3/(1+r)3 + … + DT/(1+r)T + PT/(1+r)T 
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As the holding period T approaches infinity, the present value of the last term—the 
appreciation of the stock—goes to zero if the stock appreciates at a rate less than the 
discount rate r.  If the dividend payments and required return remain constant this 
equation simplifies to 
P = D/r 
A second simplified case is that of a stock which pays no dividends, but is 
expected to appreciate and be worth some greater value at the time of sale T in the future.  
As there are no payments except that received from selling the stock at the later date, the 
present value or fair current price in this case is 
P =  PT/(1+r)T, 
where PT is the expected value of the holding in the future and r is again the opportunity 
cost of capital.   
In reality, a stock return is usually due to both dividend payments and 
appreciation of the stock price, the dividend is growing, and the time horizon for cashing 
out is significantly less than infinity.  If the rate of dividend growth is constant, this vastly 
more complex case can be dramatically simplified.  The price of the stock at any point in 
the future should in theory reflect the present value (in that later period) of the discounted 
cash flows still to be made to the stockholder.  As a result, appreciation of the stock price 
is merely a reflection of higher expected dividend payments, and the entire value is again 
just the present value of all future dividend payments.6    If the dividend grows 
perpetually at a constant growth rate g, the fair price of the stock is 
P = D1/(r-g), 
where D1 is the amount of the first dividend payment.  It is with this equation, 
constrained by the assumptions of the next section, that the implications of the previous 
chapters are assessed. 
 
 
                                                 
6 For a more elaborate explanation of this concept, refer to Brealy, Myers and Allen (2006),  p. 62. 
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B. ISSUES AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Any attempt to apply the aforementioned stock valuation techniques to the market 
faces several obvious problems.  Likewise, attempts to apply such models to the entire 
corporate sector as understood by value-added methodologies face additional difficulties.  
The main concerns are: 
• Dividend payments and their growth rates do not appear constant over time, 
there are questions as to whether the cost of capital is constant over time, and 
all three vary across both industries and firms. 
• Most people agree that stock prices, at least in the short run, do not appear 
bound by such rational price determinations. 
• The return to the investors is more accurately depicted as what they receive 
after taxes. 
• Corporate value added has no posted price in the stock market. 
• The stocks of corporations change hands over time, and new corporations are 
formed. 
Each of these issues is addressed in the following sections. 
 
1. Dividend Payments, Dividend Growth and the Expected Rate of 
Return 
Clearly dividend payments by companies and the growth rate of these dividends 
vary over time, at times significantly.  Likewise, there is substantial debate over whether 
or not the required return to capital remains constant.  To fit the data into a useful model, 
several assumptions are made here.  First, it is assumed that the return to capital r is 
constant for any given level of risk.  This means in the long run investors have demanded 
and will continue to expect the same return to capital investments.  This does not 
preclude variances, as the constant return is an expected return and not an actual return.  




can even expect periods where performance is better or worse than this return, as long as 
previous or subsequent periods revert to the mean in such a way as to make the return 
approximate r.7   
Assuming that the required return is constant still raises the question “Constant at 
what level?”  Financial theory generally predicts a positive correlation between the return 
to an investment and the riskiness of the firm or project involved.  This relationship 
stipulates higher expected returns for riskier endeavors.  In the capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM), the relationship between risk and reward is linear and expressed as 
r = rf + β(rm – rf)  
where rf is the return of a risk-free investment, β is that investment’s covariance with the 
market divided by the variance of the market, rm is the return from investing in the market 
as a whole,  and (rm – rf) is the risk premium associated with taking on risk levels 
different than that of the market.   
A model like the CAPM predicts that the only risk rewarded in the marketplace is 
that which can not be diversified away.  This risk which is not diversifiable is also known 
as market risk.  In this study the investment being examined is the entire domestic 
corporate sector.  Because this “investment” is very closely tied to the performance of the 
U.S. stock market, β in this case should be very close to one.  In that case, the previous 
equation simplifies to 
r = rm 
Therefore, the required rate of return is simply that which is required of the market as a 
whole, which is assumed to be constant over time.   
The next assumption addresses the dividend paid (D) and the growth rate (g) of 
those payments over time.  Here it is assumed that the dividends D grow at a constant rate 
g.  In other words the dividend Dt in any period t can be expressed as 
Dt = D0 * (1+g)t 
                                                 
7 For a more complete discussion of how mean reversion affects expected returns, see Siegel (2002). 
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While dividends do actually vary over time, historical trends suggest they are generally 
increasing, and that in the long run that growth seems to be mean reverting.  Figure 6 
below depicts actual dividends paid since 1929.  A best fit log-linear regression line has 
been overlaid to give a sense of how well such a constant growth model represents the 
underlying data, and thus how good an assumption a constant g might be.  The regression 
has an adjusted R-squared of about 0.96, and both the intercept and the coefficient are 
























Figure 6.   U.S. Dividends Since 1929 
 
While the discussion thus far presents stock valuations in terms of dividends, the 
market more often speaks of valuations in terms of earnings.  In essence, dividends are 
simply the portion of a corporation’s earnings which it elects to return to the owners.  As 
a result, the size of this return over time then is dependent on two things: the growth in 
earnings for the company and its decision as to how large a portion of those earnings to 
return to the owners, also known as the payout ratio.  Therefore, the dividend in any 
period can also be portrayed as 
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Dt = Et * pt  
where pt is the payout ratio—the percentage of earnings paid out as dividends—in any 
year t.  If earnings growth is constant at the growth rate g, the last two equations can be 
combined as 
Dt = E0 * (1+g)t * pt 
When g is held constant, it should be apparent that the payout ratio pt must also be 
constant by necessity if D is expected to grow at a constant rate.  History shows that this 
rate has in fact varied over time, as can be seen in Figure 7 below.  While the constraints 
that g and pt remain constant are relaxed later, they provide a baseline case from which to 































Figure 7.   Payout Ratios for U.S. Corporations Since 1940 
 
2. Are Markets Rational? 
Anyone who has watched the markets can attest to the apparent irrationality of 
their movements at times.  Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1989) examined the largest 
single-day movements in the last century of the U.S. stock market.  They argue that fewer 
than 1 in 4 of them can be explained by any logical event or new information that would 
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lead investors to change their estimates of dividends (or earnings), expected growth rates, 
or required rates of return.  Likewise, many experts join Schiller (2005) in arguing the 
market today is significantly overvalued based on historical growth assumptions.  
Opposing them are the so-called “new economy” theorists, who argue that the economy 
has undergone a seismic shift following which old models are no longer valid.  Amidst 
such chaos one might question whether there is any value in making analytical valuations 
when either the world is irrational or such old economy techniques no longer apply. 
The best argument against the accusation of irrationality is time.  Allowing for 
some illogical valuations in the short run (of even years perhaps), markets have 
consistently and repeatedly corrected back to levels more consistent with underlying—
and therefore rational—valuations in the long run.  While this may be of little immediate 
consolation to the investor whose portfolio is currently underwater, it should provide 
comfort to those who take the long-term view and provide reassurance that rationality 
will eventually prevail.  From an economic standpoint, the money made during such 
deviations from underlying valuations is better thought of as income transfers and not 
returns.  When viewed in this light it is those who sell when markets are overpriced who 
will make money on the short term irrationality, and therefore even the short-lived gains 
will largely go to the rational investor.   
Whether or not the new economy arguments can be dismissed as easily depends 
on what is meant by the term.  If the belief is that the old equations of valuing assets can 
be discarded, the proponents of such views are likely to suffer the same fate as the 
irrational investors.  In fact, they essentially are one and the same.  Changes to the 
underlying structure can change the estimates plugged into the equations, but they can not 
change the inherent way value is created and measured.  Valuations that move away from 
these fundamentals are, in effect, bubbles, and sooner or later they correct.  However, if 
what is meant by the new economy is that growth rates or required returns have changed, 
their arguments at least deserve to be heard.  The effects of changing the estimates of 




3. The Implications of Taxes on Valuations 
If presented with the two following investments, which would the investor prefer: 
a prospect which nominally offers a return of $2, but half of which has to be given up in 
the form of taxes, or an investment that pays only $1 but pays no taxes?  Obviously, in 
the end both actually produce one dollar of usable income to the investor, and therefore 
are both equally valued by the financial analyst.  This simple example is meant to 
highlight an important point—that taxes matter.  Not only does the tax code in the U.S. 
provide dozens of nuances that affect the returns to an investor, but also the implications 
of the tax code vary by the type of investor, by the form of investment and by year.  
Sorting out this chaos is a growth industry for both accountants and lobbyists alike, but in 
general the details are well beyond the scope of this analysis.  For the purposes here, it 
should suffice to acknowledge the ramifications of taxation, and to assume all cash 
inflows are net of tax. 
 
4. Pricing the Entire Market 
If one is trying to calculate the fair price of a publicly traded stock or a basket of 
such stocks, it is easy to do so if he feels confident in his estimates of future dividends 
and the rate of return.  Indices such at the Dow, NASDAQ and S&P 500 indicate the 
prevailing market valuation of their underlying portfolios any given time.  If however the 
desired basket is the domestic corporate sector, no such price is readily available for 
several reasons.  First, the inclusion of all U.S. corporations in the value-added data 
means that numerous companies whose stocks are not widely traded are included.  While 
the government data does not include S corporation data in its corporate totals, there are 
still many corporations whose stocks are either privately held or thinly traded that are not 
part of these indices.  As a result, there is no readily available market price for their 
stocks, and so their contribution to the basket is not readily identifiable.  While future 
studies may explore this issue, it is assumed here both that the major corporations 
included in the indices constitute the bulk of U.S. corporate activity and that their 
performance measurements are sufficiently representative of the overall corporate 
segment. 
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The second problem is that even for the publicly traded companies, the posted 
stock price reflects the market value of the entire organization, which often includes both 
foreign and domestic operations.  The corporate value-added data is comprised of 
domestic production only, so the contribution of the foreign production by domestic 
corporations would have to be excluded.  Likewise, the U.S. production of foreign 
companies needs to be included for similar reasons.  The extent of this concern is difficult 
to determine, partially due to the difficulty in discerning, from government data available, 
the net effect.  While corporate profits received from the rest of the world are published, 
corporate payouts to the rest of the world are lumped in with all income payments to 
foreign entities in the NIPA accounts.  The incomplete portrait is mixed.  Profits from 
overseas have jumped from 4.2 percent of overall corporate profits in 1948 to 14.8 
percent in 2005.8  This could be taken as implying that U.S. corporations are substituting 
overseas growth for domestic growth.  On the other hand, overall income receipts from 
the rest of the world have remained nearly balanced with income payments to the rest of 
the world.  The difference between the two was only $31.8 billion in a $12,456 billion 
economy.  This suggests that for every bit of growth U.S. companies find overseas, they 
are surrendering an equivalent amount in the domestic markets.  For this reason, it is 
assumed that the opposing trends have a neutral effect overall. 
Therefore, to impute a price of this domestic corporate production, it is assumed 
that the P/E ratio of the S&P 500 serves as a close approximation for the P/E ratio of this 
related but not identical basket of corporate activity.  While this assumption ignores the 
impact of smaller companies and does not account for the global nature of the firms in 
this index, the author is confident it will suffice for an initial evaluation of domestic 




                                                 
8 These calculations are a compilation of data taken from a number of BEA tables, mainly Table 1.7.5, 
Table 1.13 and Table 1.14.  The breakdown of National Income by legal form of organization data is only 
available back to 1948.  Overseas corporate profits rose from $1.3B (of $31.2B total) in 1948 to $197B (of 
$1,330B total) in 2005. 
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5. Ownership Changes and the Survivor Bias 
The last issue concerns changes occurring over time within the market.  These 
include ownership transfers, new entrants and the departure of old corporations.  The 
transfer by sale of ownership from one party to another is not a large concern in the 
analysis at hand.  While many researchers are particularly interested in who possesses the 
stock over time, here it simply does not matter.  As in the GDP accounts themselves, the 
transfer of an asset (in this case ownership of the corporation) from one party to another 
is immaterial in accounting for its performance.  The outcome—the growth in earnings 
and the dividends paid—is what matters.  Likewise, the price paid above or below fair 
market value for any individual transaction is also immaterial.  Any premium or discount 
relative to the underlying value paid by the buyer is merely a transfer of wealth from the 
buyer to the seller, or vice versa.  While the return to the individual is affected, this return 
is the summation of the actual return on the investment and this transfer.  Because the 
income transfer has both a winner and a loser, the overall effects of this portion cancel 
each other out when aggregated.  The remaining return will be that of the stock itself, 
priced at its underlying fair value.  This truth affects numerous cases: a transfer of stock 
from one individual to another, the purchase of a company by another, the spin-off of a 
division into a separate company, and the stock going from publicly held to privately held 
corporation (or vice versa).  Therefore, the transfer of the stock has no relevance to the 
calculations.  In the cases where a private business becomes corporate (or vice versa), the 
corporate value added data captures these changes in status, and therefore should 
accurately reflect such alterations in the market. 
The second concern is how to handle the emergence of new corporations and the 
demise of old ones.  In the financial sector, this issue can significantly distort 
performance calculations and is known as the survivor bias.  In essence, it reflects the 
fact that indices are updated over time, with new companies being added as they become 
significant forces in the market and others being removed as they fade into oblivion.  
Because companies are added while they are growing, and dropped while they are fading 
(or even imploding), the indices tend to reflect an upward bias.  While this is a serious 
concern, it should not affect the value-added data here.  Because the underlying data are 
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an aggregate of all domestic data, the losses incurred by the underperformers are 
accounted for and accurately marked against the earnings of the overall segment.  For any 
year, the destruction of value committed by the weakest businesses is factored in with the 
creation of value by the best, and fully accounted for in an economic sense.  
  
C. VALUING THE DOMESTIC CORPORATE MARKET 
Armed with the above assumptions, one can make some observations about 
current market valuations.  One of the most frequently used yardsticks used measure 
value in the stock market is the price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio.  This ratio evaluates the 
price of a share of a corporation as a multiple of either the present year’s actual or the 
upcoming year’s expected earnings.  As the earlier analysis calculated the fair price of a 
stock as the discounted present value of the cash dividends, one last conversion is needed.  
Because dividends are equal to earnings times the payout ratio, the price of a stock with 
steadily increasing earnings and a constant payout ratio can be written as 
P = E1 * p1/(r-g). 
By moving earnings to the left side, the equation can be rewritten in terms of a P/E ratio 
as 
P/E = p1/(r-g) 
Given any three of the four variables (price-to-earnings ratio, payout ratio, required rate 
of return and expected growth), the remaining unknown can be determined. 
Choosing an appropriate value for the payout ratio p is difficult.  As shown in 
Figure 7, the ratio has been as high as 1 in 1938 and reached a low of 0.3 in 2000.  The 
current ratio of about 0.4 is used here as a baseline assumption.  While somewhat less 
volatile, P/E ratios have also exhibited significant variability.  Figure 8 depicts the P/E 
ratios for the S&P 500 since 1929, as calculated by Schiller (2005).9    A P/E ratio of 25 
is chosen as representative of the monthly average since 2002.   
                                                 
9 For interested parties, Shiller has made all of his underlying data available for review at 

























Figure 8.   Price to Earnings Ratio for the S&P 500 
 
Ibbotson and Chen’s calculation (2003) of an average real market return since 1926 of 
7.4 percent per year is used as an estimate of the required market return r.10  Substituting 
these values into the equation, it is possible to calculate the expected dividend growth 
implied by current market valuations: 
 25 = 0.4/(0.074-g), or 
 g = 5.8% 
In other words, if dividends could grow at a rate of 5.8 percent annually 
indefinitely, a P/E ratio of 25 represents the fair price of a market portfolio if the investor 
demands a 7.4 percent return and can expect a payout ratio of about 40 percent of 
earnings.  This would also require earnings to grow at 5.8 percent per year if the payout 
ratio is to hold steady.  Furthermore, since it is unlikely that profits as a percentage of 
value-added will increase, this will require corporate value-added to increase at the same 
                                                 
10 Ibbotson and Chen estimate that the risk-free return over this period was 2.05 percent annually, and 
the risk premium for the market was 5.24 percent.  The real annual return to the market is therefore 
calculated as (1 + 0.025)*(1 + 0.0524), which equals 1.074 or 7.4 percent. 
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rate.  However, for the reasons spelled out in previous chapters, the main argument of this 
paper is that earnings growth of 5.8 percent cannot be maintained if economic growth is 
only in the range of 2 to 3 percent annually forecasted.  Specifically, assuming that the 
U.S. can not find a way to increase annual economic growth above the expected 2 to 3 
percent, ultimately dividend growth will have to slow to approximately the same rate.   
Given such limitations, one can ask what such a slowdown would imply for the 
market valuations.  If the same assumptions for payout ratios and the return demanded 
are used but expected growth is decreased from 5.8 to 3.5 percent, the fair P/E ratio can 
be calculated as follows: 
 P/E = 0.4/(0.074-0.035) or 
 P/E = 10.3 
If the investor still expects a 7.4 percent return but can only hope for 3.5 percent 
growth in dividends, this implies a fall in the price of the market portfolio of almost 60 
percent.  Does this mean that the market is currently overpriced (based on the stated 
assumptions) by 140 percent?  The answer is “not exactly”.  For such a precipitous drop 
to be warranted, the new growth rate would have to take effect immediately.  However, 
the slowdown this paper predicts is not that imminent.  In the short run, corporate value-
added may continue to expand its share of gross domestic product.  This would allow 
corporate earnings and therefore dividends to grow faster than economic growth.  If 
dividends can grow at the initial rate of 5.8 percent for years before slowing to the 
steady-state pace, the appropriate P/E ratio then is indeed much higher than the 10.3 just 
calculated.  Determining the P/E ratio in such a case requires a two-stage model of 
dividends, where dividend growth is at a certain rate g1 initially until time t, and then 
changes to g2 thereafter until time T.  In such cases the P/E ratios can be expressed as 
P/E  =  p1/(1+r) + p1(1+g1)/(1+r)2 + … + p1(1+g1)t-1/(1+r)t   
                       + [p1(1+g1)]t-1(1+g2)/(1+r)t+1 + [p1(1+g1)]t-1(1+g2)2/(1+r)t+1 
              + [p1(1+g1)]t-1(1+g2)T-t/(1+r)T 
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If the latter period is again thought to be of infinite duration, the second half of 
the right side of the equation can be simplified such that11 
P/E  =  p1/(1+r) + p1(1+g1)/(1+r)2 + … + p1(1+g1)t-1/(1+r)t 
    + [p1(1+g1)t-1(1+g2)/(r-g2)]/(1+r)t    
This equation can be used to calculate a fair P/E valuation based on one’s estimates of the 
payout ratio (p1), required return (r), the expected growth in each stage (g1 and g2), and 
the time t at which the change in growth rates occurs.  Using the same assumptions for p1 
and r, the initial dividend growth is assumed to be the 5.8 percent calculated earlier, while 
an optimistic economic growth rate of 3.5 percent is used for g2.  By selecting a wide 
range of horizons t at which this slowdown might occur, one can infer the appropriate P/E 
for each case.  Table 5 below shows these values. 
 
 
Number of Years Implied Fair Market Required Price Drop






100 21.71 13%  
Table 5.   Fair P/E Ratio for Various Slowdown Horizons 
 
The calculations highlight several points.  First, it should be readily apparent that 
if the assumptions made thus far are valid, then the current P/E ratios are too high.  Even 
if the slowdown does not occur for 100 years, a P/E ratio of 25 is still 13 percent above 
the calculated fair value.  Second, because saying that earnings are 13 percent too low 
would have little meaning, it is fair to say that under these conditions the price is 15 
percent too high.  While the magnitude of the required correction decreases as the 
horizon of the slowdown is extended out, the fact remains that a correction is required.   
                                                 
11 See Brealey, Myers and Allen (2006) or Fair (2000) for a more thorough discussion of two-step 
stock valuation models. 
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D. THE IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE ASSUMPTIONS 
The analysis to this point has relied on specific assumptions about the growth rate 
(g), the return required by the investor (r), and the payout ratio (p) to illustrate in simplest 
terms the effects of slower growth on stock valuations.  What valuations one thinks make 
sense is largely shaped by one’s expectations about these values in the future.  While the 
values chosen attempt to approximate either recent or historical conditions found in the 
market, it would be easy for anyone to reach different conclusions about the best values 
to use.  With that in mind this section attempts to anticipate some of these potential 
objections by examining the effects of changes in one or more of the previous 
assumptions. 
 
1. New Economy Growth 
Since the boom of the 1990s, new economy theories abound, suggesting that 
future growth rates will break out of the traditional range predicted by economists and 
history alike.  Hanson (2000) takes the argument to its limit, arguing that future growth 
could produce a scenario where the doubling of output is measured in days rather than 
years.  These theories generally hold that technology will drive innovation and 
productivity growth well above anything witnessed thus far.  This would allow output 
growth dramatically in excess of the growth of inputs to production.  While such 
revolutionary growth would produce dramatic improvements in the quality of life, it 
would also enable profit growth for corporations in excess of that forecast here.  
Although the bursting of the dotcom bubble took some of the passion out of the new 
economy proponents, it is worth discussing how such changes could affect the model 
presented here. 
To consider the effects of unprecedented growth, one must first decide whether he 
believes this new growth will be solely in the corporate sector, or if it will spill over into 
the economy as a whole.  If the answer is the latter, then the waters ahead are truly 
uncharted.  Such a case would increase the growth rates of both the economy and 
corporations.  The g in the models would not be limited in the long run to the paltry 2-3 
percent GDP growth forecasted by the government and most economists, but instead to  
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whatever new growth rate the economy can sustain.  While appealing, this growth would 
come despite the predictions of most everyone involved in forecasting exactly these 
numbers.   
In simple terms, production is determined by three components: capital, labor, and 
the productivity with which they are used.  With the exception of a jump in the decade 
surrounding 1940, output per unit of capital has remained relatively constant over time 
(Blanchard and Fischer, 1989), and it does not appear that new economy theorists expect 
that to change.  Likewise, population growth in the U.S. is estimated at only about 1 
percent per year.  While major changes in labor participation rates or hours worked could 
also provide one-time lifts to GDP, the upcoming retirements of the baby boomers 
suggest this is a highly unlikely scenario.  It is for these reasons that the productivity 
component is the most focused upon and hotly debated driver of growth forecasts.    If 
population growth is at 1 percent, and hours worked per person remain steady, 
productivity would in essence have to increase at 2.5 percent annually just to reach the 
3.5 percent overall growth rate used earlier for this study.  Such productivity gains, while 
wonderful, lie above most estimates of what can be hoped for.12  Therefore, while this is 
not impossible, it would seem the overwhelming majority of analysts are not counting on 
these types of gains. 
If, on the other hand, this new growth were to improve corporate productivity 
while leaving the overall economic productivity unchanged, the disjoint between the 
corporate and economic sectors is only made worse.  If economic growth is estimated at 
3.5 percent and corporate growth 4.1 percent annually, it would take 51 and 89 years for 
corporate value added to reach 80 percent and 100 percent of GDP respectively.  If 
corporate growth increases—to say the 5.8 percent calculated in the last section—but the 
economy continues to grow at the 3.5 percent used before, the year before which CVA 
reaches its maximum level of GDP jumps even closer.  Such a large change in the growth 
rate of corporate value added would see it reach 80 percent of GDP in a mere 13 years, 
                                                 
12 Estimates of future annual productivity gains include 2.2 percent through the year 2016 
(Congressional Budget Office, 2006b), 1.7 percent through 2080 (Board of Trustees, 2006) and 1.4 percent 
through 2016 and beyond (Government Accounting Office, n.d.). 
  59
and an implausible 100 percent of GDP only ten years after that.  Such incredible 
numbers highlight the improbability that such a growth disparity could persist for very 
long.  While corporate growth may at times pull away from economic growth in the short 
run—it has averaged over 4 percent in real terms for most of the last decade—the 
increased disparity between corporate and economic growth will only accelerate the 
arrival of the eventually inevitable slowdown. 
 
2. Changes in the Required Return 
The second change worthy of consideration is the possibility that the required 
return r has changed.  Siegel (2002) argues that due to decreases in economic volatility 
and a better understanding of risk, investors have lowered the risk premium and therefore 
the total return required for investing in the market.  While he generally avoids 
calculating a number, he does mention a range of 4 to 5 percent as a real possibility.  It is 
possible to substitute this alternative value into the earlier equation and find the new 
appropriate P/E ratio.  If 3.5 percent is still used for g and 0.4 for p, but 5 percent is now 
used for r: 
 P/E = 0.4/(0.05-0.035) 
 P/E = 26.67 
Surprisingly enough, the reasonable long term P/E ratio in this case closely 
matches the actual present P/E ratio.  Such an explanation of today’s P/E ratios would be 
consistent with some of Siegel’s conclusions as well.  While most of the time his outlook 
is more bullish, he does allude to the possibility of P/E ratios in the 20s accompanied by 
lower future returns.   
The validity of this explanation is untested at present.  It is unlikely a survey of 
investors would produce such a low number as their expected future market return.  
Likewise, admissions of such a target by corporate America would likely be met by a 
massive selloff in the equities markets.  These facts argue against this possible 
justification of current market valuations.  Still, the theory is appealing to the extent it 
provides a justification that fits both present P/E ratios and future expected growth 
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estimates into a coherent model.  Only further analysis and time itself can answer the 
question of whether or not it actually has merit on its side. 
 
3. Changes to the Payout Ratio 
The final element of the model presented here that can significantly alter the 
valuations is the payout ratio.  The large historical volatility in payout ratios leaves room 
for honest disagreements over what should be expected in the future.  This argument is 
bolstered by the fact that this ratio presently stands near the low end of its historical 
range.  Holding the other variable steady, a change in the payout ratio would increase 
cashflows to the investor.  Higher cashflows lead in turn to higher prices, which finally 
generate a higher justified P/E ratio.  However, there is likely a relationship between 
payout ratios and future growth that lies deeper than the superficial analysis presented 
here.  Earnings not paid out as dividends are retained by the company and invested 
internally in the development of future products and more efficient production methods.  
This feedback mechanism should allow decreases in the payout ratio to drive increases in 
the future growth rate.  In essence, this connection between the two will make it hard to 
change the payout ratio while holding everything else constant. 
Setting aside momentarily the possible interaction between the variables, it is 
interesting to examine the effects of a change to the payout ratio.  For example, an 
examination of the P/E equation suggests a perfect correlation between the payout ratio p 
and the P/E ratio.  A doubling of the payout ratio to 0.8 would allow the P/E ratio to 
double, while a 20 percent decrease in the payout ought to cause a 20 percent decrease in 
the P/E ratio.   
Setting aside temporarily the issue of the interplay between payout ratios and 
growth, one last point can be noted about the relationship between payout ratios and P/E 
valuations.  Suppose that the required return remains 7.4 percent and long term growth is 
indeed limited to 3.5 percent.  Is it possible a change in the payout ratio could justify a 
P/E ratio of 25?  Plugging this set of numbers into the equation: 
 
  61
25 = p/(0.074-0.035) 
 p = 0.975. 
Therefore, if corporations were to pay nearly every cent of earnings—97.5 
percent to be exact—in dividends, the market could justify the present P/E ratio while 
meeting historic returns to investors within this diminished growth scenario.  However, 
for the reasons listed above one must be skeptical of such analysis.  It is unlikely that the 
corporations could meet the capital investment requirements of even this lower growth 
without retaining a higher share of their earnings or radically altering their debt-to-equity 
ratios.  The former would again decrease the payout ratio, while the latter would increase 
the default risk and therefore cause investors to demand a higher rate of return.  How all 
of the forces ultimately come together is uncertain.  
This chapter has attempted to answer questions regarding how limits to growth in 
corporate value added could affect returns to investors in the market.  While numerous 
assumptions must be made to fit the data into standard valuation models, these 
assumptions do not differ that greatly from those in a one-stock valuation.  The analysis 
presented in this chapter lends weight to notions that the market is indeed overpriced at 
present P/E ratios near 25.  However, it is possible that actual values for the different 
























There can be little doubt that corporations have been expanding their presence in 
the U.S. economy.  A casual observation of the business landscape quickly finds 
industries and niches that, having once been served by thousands of small proprietors, are 
now becoming the domain of several dominant players.  While some might lament the 
loss of the local “mom-and-pop” producer, it is likely that the trend has been fueled by 
the choices of millions of consumers preferring the price, standardization, or range of 
selection offered by the corporate competitor that replaced it.  As a result, corporate 
production in the United States has grown even faster than the economy as a whole.  In 
an economy expected to grow by only 2 to 4 percent annually in the decades ahead, this 
additional growth is vital if corporations are to meet the expectations of their investors.  
At the same time, it must be acknowledged that this source of growth cannot continue 
forever.  At some point the corporate sector will expand its piece of the economic pie as 
far as is possible.  After that point aggregate corporate growth in domestic production 
will be limited to the rate achieved by the economy as a whole. 
It is extremely difficult to estimate the point in the future when this will be the 
case.  Economists are still struggling to build models that can accurately forecast growth 
out more than a few quarters, and exogenous shocks can leave even the best forecast in 
tatters.  War, changes in fertility rates and productivity-altering innovations are just a few 
of the events that can have dramatic impacts on growth.  If the trends of the last century 
are any guide this limit could be reached in a little as a couple of decades, or perhaps not 
for hundreds of years.  Although impossible to say with any certainty, it seems fair to say 
that many people alive today could still be around when this point finally arrives.  While 
it might not be so close as to affect the day-to-day choices of the average consumer, it 
could very easily affect the strategic choices of individuals, businesses and governmental 
organizations alike. 
In no area would the effects of a slowdown in corporate growth be felt more than 
in the stock market.  Stock prices are largely driven by expectations regarding future 
earnings, and solid growth is the expectation.  A slowdown, even if decades down the 
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road, would have negative consequences on today’s prices if recognized.  Such a 
downturn would affect not only the ability of the corporations to raise future capital, but 
also how much the stockholder must save for his retirement and how much revenue the 
government can expect to have at its disposal. 
Despite the gloomy outlook offered, the findings presented here do not preordain 
an unpleasant future for the stock market.  As mentioned repeatedly, this study looks only 
at the domestic portion of corporate production, which is decreasing in importance as a 
source of earnings for most large corporations.  The globalization of the economy is 
opening up new possibilities and new markets for growth.  Companies that are successful 
at capturing these markets, or creating entirely new markets through innovation, will 
thrive and their stocks will be rewarded.  However, the globalization of production and 
trade also brings challenges.  For every producer they squeeze overseas, domestic 
corporations will face a new competitor looking to “steal” their domestic market. 
The interplay between these two opposing forces—the ability of corporations to 
compensate for limited domestic growth through expansion into foreign markets, and the 
threat of foreign producers to their current market share—is the piece of the puzzle most 
in need of further study.  There can be no doubt that corporate value added cannot exceed 
gross domestic product.  Therefore the ability of corporations to supplant this current 
domestic growth with a new source overseas will determine whether the evidence 
presented here precipitates a correction in the markets or merely serves as a footnote as 
corporate growth moves elsewhere. 
Two other areas stand out as prime targets for future investigation.  First, more 
complex methods of estimating growth are likely to yield better forecasts of future 
growth.  As they apply to the issues presented here, the real gains will come not simply 
from a better forecast of economic or corporate growth, but from a better ability to 
forecast the disparity between the two.  As the precision is improved, the massive range 
in the forecast horizons can be narrowed.  The largest remaining source of uncertainty in 
the models then would be the question of what percentage of GDP can really come from 
corporations. 
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Second, the reliance here on historical or recent averages of payout ratios and 
required rates of return leaves something to be desired.  Siegel’s notion that high P/E 
ratios might be warranted by a decrease in the rate of return required in equity markets is 
worth exploring.  Additionally, a better explanation of the feedback loop between payout 
ratios and future growth would help create a more concise picture of what is likely to 
happen if corporate growth slows.  Such a slowdown presumably would produce higher 
payout ratios as companies return earnings to investors as dividends for want of 
worthwhile growth opportunities.  An improved understanding of these effects would 
allow better stock valuations than the ones presented here. 
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